

# 1 Globalizations

This fourth and final volume of my study of the history of power in human societies covers the period since 1945. It will focus on the three major pillars of postwar global order: capitalism (and the fate of the Soviet and Chinese alternatives to capitalism), the nation-state system, and the sole remaining empire of the world, the United States. The most obvious characteristic of all three in this period is their expansion over the globe, a process universally called globalization. Yet in my third volume I pluralized this term to indicate that more than one process of globalization was under way. As I have argued throughout my volumes, human societies form around four distinct power sources – ideological, economic, military, and political – which have a relative degree of autonomy from each other (this is my IEMP model of power). Their globalizations have also been relatively autonomous and remain so in this period. But the power sources are ideal types. They do not exist in pure form in the real world. Instead, they congeal around the major macroinstitutions of society – in this case, capitalism, the nation-state, and empires. The major novel ideologies of the period emanate from human attempts to understand the entwining of these three.

Let me first give a short definition of the four power sources. More detailed exposition can be found in the first chapters of my other three volumes. Power is the capacity to get others to do things that otherwise they would not do. In order to achieve our goals, whatever they are, we enter into power relations involving both cooperation and conflict with other people, and these relations generate societies. So power may be collective, embodying cooperation to achieve shared goals – power through others– and distributive, wielded by some over others. There are four main sources of both powers.

- (1) **Ideological power** derives from the human need to find ultimate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices with others. Ideologies change as the problems we face change. The power of ideological movements derives from our inability to attain certainty in our knowledge of the world. We fill in the gaps and the uncertainties with beliefs that are not in themselves scientifically testable but that embody our hopes and our fears. No one can prove the existence of a god or the viability of a socialist or an Islamist future. Ideologies become especially necessary in crises where the old institutionalized ideologies and practices no longer seem to work and where alternatives offered have as yet no track record. That is when we are most susceptible to the power of ideologists who offer us plausible but untestable theories of the world. Ideological power is generally a response to

## 2 The sources of social power

developments in the other three power sources, but it then develops an emergent power of its own. It tends to be very uneven, suddenly important when we have to grapple with unexpected crisis, much less so at other times. Revived religious meaning systems will figure in this period, as will secular ideologies like patriarchy, liberalism, socialism, nationalism, racism, and environmentalism.

- (2) **Economic power** derives from the human need to extract, transform, distribute, and consume the produce of nature. Economic relations are powerful because they combine the intensive mobilization of labor with more extensive networks of exchange. Contemporary capitalism has made global its circuits of capital, trade, and production chains, yet at the same time its power relations are those that penetrate most routinely into most peoples' lives, taking up about one-half of our waking hours. The social change economies produce is rarely swift or dramatic, unlike military power. It is slow, cumulative, and eventually profound. The main organization of economic power in modern times has been industrial capitalism, whose global development is central to this volume. Capitalism treats all the means of production, including labor, as commodities. All four main forms of market – for capital, for labor, for production, and for consumption – are traded against each other. Capitalism has been the most consistently dynamic power organization in recent times, responsible for most technological innovation – and most environmental degradation.
- (3) **Military power.** I define military power as the social organization of concentrated and lethal violence. “Concentrated” means mobilized and focused; “lethal” means deadly. *Webster's Dictionary* defines “violence” as exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse, or intense, turbulent, or furious and often destructive action or force. Thus military force is focused, physical, furious, and above all lethal. It kills. Military power holders say if you resist, you die. Since a lethal threat is terrifying, military power evokes distinctive psychological emotions and physiological symptoms of fear, as we confront the possibility of pain, dismemberment, or death. Military power is most lethally wielded by the armed forces of states in interstate wars, though paramilitaries, guerrillas, and terrorists will all figure in this volume. Here is an obvious overlap with political power, though militaries always remain separately organized, often as a distinct caste in society.
- (4) **Political power** is the centralized and territorial regulation of social life. The basic function of government is the provision of order over a given territory. Here I deviate not only from Max Weber, who located political power (or “parties”) in any organization, not just states, but also from political scientists' notion of governance administered by diverse entities, including corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and social movements. I prefer to reserve the term “political” for the state – including local and regional as well as national-level government. States and not NGOs or corporations have the centralized-territorial form, which makes their rule authoritative over persons residing in their territories. I can resign membership of an NGO or a corporation and so flaunt its rules. I must obey the rules of the state in whose territory I reside or suffer punishment. Networks of political power are routinely regulated and coordinated in a centralized and territorial fashion. So political power is more geographically bounded than the other three sources. States also normally cover smaller, tighter areas than do ideologies

So what is generally called globalization involved the extension of distinct relations of ideological, economic, military, and political power across the world.

Concretely, in the period after 1945 this means the diffusion of ideologies like liberalism and socialism, the spread of the capitalist mode of production, the extension of military striking ranges, and the extension of nation-states across the world, at first with two empires and then with just one surviving. The relations among such phenomena form the subject matter of this volume.

Most discussions of globalization are not particularly interesting. In itself globalization has no distinctive content other than its range. Globalization does not *do* anything – with one exception to be discussed in a moment. Globalization in itself cannot be praised or blamed for the state of human society, for it is merely the product of expansions of the sources of social power. This is reflected in the fact that globalization has not generated innovative theories of society; theories previously used in the days when social scientists equated societies with nation-states have for the most part simply had their range expanded geographically, although this is often concealed by the desire of theorists to claim fame by unearthing fundamental transformations of society. Hyperglobalizers claim that globalization has led to a fundamentally different kind of society. More pejoratively, one might call this globaloney. Yet one aspect of globalization is intrinsically transformative: where human actions expand until they fill up the earth and rebound back on us. This is a boomerang effect whereby actions launched by human beings hit up against the limits of the earth and then return to hit them hard and change them. We can already see two ways this might occur. The first is that weapons of war have become so deadly that a nuclear or biological war might actually destroy human civilization. We already live under this threat, and I discuss it in Chapter 2. The second threat has not yet materialized but is predictable: economic expansion increases the harmful emissions produced by burning fossil fuels, and this too might eventually make human civilization insupportable. I discuss this in Chapter 12. Marxists identify a third possible boomerang. They argue that the expansion of capitalist markets might eventually fill up the earth, making further economic expansion impossible and generating major crisis. But to analyze these particular scenarios we must give content to globalization in terms of economic or military power relations. They, not globalization itself, produce the boomerang effect.

The most popular way of giving content to globalization has been to identify capitalism as its essential driver. Materialists see globalization as driven by economic pressures powered by capitalists' drive for profit, which in this period has generated revolutions in communications technology allowing the global extension of production chains and markets. No one can doubt that this has helped produce a remarkable expansion of capitalism across the globe. Only China now lies half-outside its sway (I discuss this in Chapter 8). Economists measure globalization by the increasing ratio of international trade to gross domestic product (GDP), or by global convergence of commodity prices, with indices of labor migration sometimes added. On these measures, we can see

that economic globalization was proceeding gradually through the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries, but then between 1860 and 1914 came a surge. This was followed by stagnation mixed with depression and wars up until 1950, followed by recovery and then a second surge beginning about 1960 (O'Rourke & Williamson, 1999). This produced the most global economy there has ever been. Though trade-to-GDP ratios and migration flows are now only a little higher than in the period before 1914, much of the real economic product could not then be measured and included in calculations, whereas international trade flows were much easier to measure. The resulting ratio was biased upward. During the second surge finance capital flows have become almost instantaneous across the world, while manufacturing chains now also spread globally. All this is discussed in Chapters 6 and 11.

Economists actually define globalization as the global integration of markets, though this neglects the other main drivers, wars, political institutions, and ideologies. They also imply that globalization occurs only when the economy grows. Yet as my volumes show, recessions go global too. It is conventional to regard the period 1914 to 1945 as one in which globalization receded. International trade as a proportion of world GDP certainly did decline. I can agree that economic integration declined in the period, but economic disintegration globalized. There was a surge in the global diffusion of socialist and fascist ideologies, plus the only two wars we call world wars, as well as a depression so great that it dislocated almost all the countries of the world. This was a period of disintegrating globalizations. Similarly, the stalling of expansion from the 1970s led to neoliberal policies that brought about the global recession of 2008. And now we are faced with an even more global economic crisis – climate change. Growth has been increasingly global, but so too have its crises. This has not been simply an onward and upward story, for every human success story has entailed severe problems while every major disaster has had a silver lining. Economic growth destroys the environment and depletes natural resources; world wars yielded greater citizen rights.

Economic expansion has also varied geographically and has so far been less than global. Its late nineteenth-century surge tended to integrate western and northern Europe and its settler colonies into an Atlantic economy, while intensifying a great divergence from the rest of the world. The second surge from the 1960s drew in southern Europe and East Asia, and then much of Asia too – but not yet Africa or central Asia. We cannot generalize about globalization without regard for its varied geography or its precise temporality. Exactly where and when it expands are always important.

Economists try to explain global expansion through growth in total factor productivity (TFP), divided into capital, labor, and land productivity, with the residual assigned to technological innovation. Unfortunately, this residual is usually large; that means that to explain growth we need an explanation of technological change, which we lack. Economic historians narrow down the

decisive nineteenth-century technological innovations to transport technologies – railroads and especially shipping – and in the early twentieth century to general-purpose technologies applicable across many industries, like electricity and the internal combustion engine. In the second surge period they have emphasized microelectronics and biotechnology. They also emphasize that the initial invention matters less than its subsequent diffusion. But to explain invention and diffusion takes economists away from their customary variables into social institutions in general. Consider the economic stagnation after World War I. There was no loss of technology; indeed communications technology was still developing. Instead, economists say, there was a failure of political institutions, with inadequate regulation of banking and currency practices and too ready a recourse to protection. Conversely, after World War II, they say that growth at first resulted more from better government policies and more open markets than from new technology. Even when the Internet and other microelectronic and microbiological products later kicked in, they produced much less growth than hyperglobalizers expected. Economists are still scratching their heads about growth and looking for help from historians, sociologists, and political scientists.

Unfortunately, we do not offer them much help. Most scholars prefer to describe rather than explain globalization. Scholte (2000: 89–110) has a go, trying to explain globalization in terms of two structural forces, capitalist production and rationalist knowledge, both in turn propelled forward by what he calls “actor initiatives” like technological innovations and governance regulation. This, however, is rather vague. My own view is that globalization results as human groups have sought to expand their collective and distributive powers to achieve their goals, and this has involved all four types of power source. It might be thought that this is a little vague, too, but much more content will be provided in the course of this volume.

Many sociologists also see globalization as primarily economic. Harvey (1989) sees it as produced in spurts by the overaccumulation of capital, and he does demonstrate the importance of this aspect. Castells is a hyperglobalizer, identifying a global “network society” modeled on the information technology revolution and its consequent restructuring of the capitalist enterprise. He says this produces changes in every aspect of life, from our material existence to our notions of civil society, nation, and self. It transforms, he declares poetically, the foundations of life, space, and time, through the constitution of a space of flows and of timeless time (1997:1). Capitalism is the new global empire, say the hyperglobalizers Hardt and Negri (2000). They see the order traditionally provided by nation-states as having been unraveled by the impact of transnational capitalism and replaced by an acephalous supranational capitalist order too complex to be monitored by any authoritative center. Sklair declares that capitalist forces are “the dominant driving force of the global system” – “a transnational capitalist class based on the transnational corporation is emerging

that is more or less in control of the processes of globalization” (2000: 5; cf. Robinson & Harris, 2000). World systems theorists identify a capitalist world system embodying a division of labor between capital-intensive production in the core countries and low-skilled labor and raw materials in the global periphery, with a semiperiphery zone lying in between. This global structure is integrated at its higher levels by capitalism, though with cultural and political pluralism surviving lower down. In the world system, they say, “the basic linkage between its parts is economic,” operating “on the primacy of the endless accumulation of capital via the eventual commodification of everything” (Wallerstein, 1974a: 390; 1974b: 15). They qualify this with a dose of geopolitics, saying that the world system developed most in periods when one single imperial state was hegemonic. First the Dutch, then the British, and most recently the Americans became hegemonic, setting the rules of the world system. As each state’s hegemony faltered, so did globalization (Arrighi, 1994; Arrighi & Silver, 1999). Yet the emergence of hegemony is attributed to the functional needs of the capitalist world system – economic power transforms geopolitical power. I critiqued this argument in Volume 3. All these models see globalization as driven by the capitalist economy, which is partly true. Yet the economy is not the only driver of human societies.

Note the relative absence in these paragraphs of the working or middle classes. In Volume 3 I argued that in the advanced countries the masses were leaping onstage in the theater of power – concentrated in cities and factories, demanding citizen rights, conscripted into mass armies, mobilized by demotic ideologies and mass parties. Yet this contrasted with the colonies, where the masses were only just beginning to stir. Now in this volume we see a partially reversed contrast. In the former colonies, nowadays styled as the South of the world, we see the masses leaping onstage in the theater of power. In the advanced countries, now styled the North of the world, we initially see the deepening of mass rights of civil, political, and social citizenship. But then we see something of a regress in the North. Of course, there is considerable variability in both the North and the South. But since most writers on the globalization of capitalism tend to focus on recent decades and on the Anglophone countries, they tend to be pessimistic about the capacity of working- and middle-class people to resist the power of capitalism, and they are alarmed by the rising inequality there among the classes. These are issues I will explore in this volume.

Materialists have been challenged by idealists, their traditional adversary, arguing that globalization is essentially ideological. Robertson says globalization is the compression of the world through the intensification of consciousness of a singular world. The world is becoming one – we apprehend it and then will it into existence (1992: 8). Waters says, “Material exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; and symbolic exchanges globalize.... We can expect the economy and the polity to be globalized to the extent that they

are culturalized” – an ideologically powered theory of globalization (1995: 7–9). Meyer and his collaborators (1997, 1999) believe globalization is driven by a world culture. Since the nineteenth century a rationalized world cultural order has emerged, embodying universal models shaping states, institutions, and individual identities. After World War II this became pervasive across the globe. States at all levels of economic development have adopted common models and institutions, generating what they call global “isomorphism.” States are not themselves the drivers of globalization. Their structure and authority derive from a broader “world polity” consisting of common legitimating models shared also by countless nongovernmental organizations like scientific associations, feminist groups, standard-setting bodies, and environmental movements. Meyer has not spent much time on explaining why this world polity/culture emerges, but he seems to say that it is driven primarily by ideological forces. We shall see once again that this model has some truth but is grossly exaggerated.

Giddens (1990), Beck (1992), and Lash and Urry (1994) do not offer such one-dimensional theories, but they suggest that recent globalization embodies a distinctive ideological “reflexivity,” by which we become aware of our impact upon the globe and then orient our actions toward devising new global rules of conduct. This, they suggest, involves a different recursive role for ideas in human conduct in our times. We monitor the impact of changes on our lives and identify our own position in relation to the larger process. No one can feel comfortably at home anymore, they say. I am not sure that this is true. Have not human beings always possessed reflexivity, and is this really a novel age of anxiety? However, we are in need of reflexivity to comprehend the boomerang effect of potential nuclear war and environmental destruction. All these arguments suffer from the traditional weakness of idealism, a tendency to see ideologies and human consciousness as flowing above societies. I prefer to see ideologies as the search for ultimate meaning in the interplay of military, political, and economic power relations.

Many materialists and idealists alike see globalization as a singular process. As the economic or cultural order fills up the planet, it generates a single world order, world society, world polity, world culture, or world system. In addition to those scholars already discussed, Albrow (1996) defines globalization as “those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, global society,” while Tomlinson (1999: 10) notes that the world is becoming one place, subject to the same forces, connected in what he calls a “unicity.” Holton does say globalizations are plural, but he sees them as comprising “one single world of human society in which all elements are tied together in one interdependent whole” (1998: 2). The notion of a single emerging global system stretches back into the nineteenth century, to St.-Simon, Comte, Spencer, and Marx and Engels’s *Communist Manifesto*, which remains the boldest statement of economic globalization. Giddens rejects this, noting

that globalization “is a process of uneven development that fragments as it coordinates” (1990: 175). I agree with him.

A few have deployed Max Weber’s three-dimensional model of cultural, economic, and political forces (Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005; Waters, 1995), and this is the closest to my own approach, though I separate military from political power relations. Postmodernists go further and reject all “master narratives,” arguing that society is infinitely complex and inexplicable. They sometimes add a tweak toward chaos theory or relativism, emphasizing global incoherence, hybridity, and fragmentation. Appadurai (1990) enumerates varied “ethnoscapes,” “mediascapes,” “technoscapes,” “finanscapes,” and “ideoscapes,” which comprise “the fluid, irregular landscapes” and “disjunctures” of globalization. Pietersee (1995) sees globalization as hybrid, involving “inherent fluidity, indeterminacy and open-endedness.” Baumann (2000), a hyperglobalizer, prefers the term “liquid modernity,” which he explains means a modernity composed of uncertain ethics, the doubting of expert belief systems, flexible organizational forms, informational war, and deterritorialized politics and economics. He declares boldly that liquid modernity has changed all aspects of the human condition. While accepting that globalization is hybrid, I resist a giddy descent into liquidity, fragmentation, and indeterminacy, preferring to see globalization as driven by a few networks that are far more powerfully structuring than others, and that have a relatively hard and durable reality. They have new forms but old pedigrees. General narratives are possible, if rendered plural and a little less grand.

The theories noted so far have not mentioned military power relations. They do mention political power relations, but usually to argue that globalization is undermining the nation-state. Ironically, until the 1990s most sociologists had ignored the nation-state. Their master concept was industrial society or capitalism, both seen as transnational. Though in practice almost all sociologists confined themselves to studying their own nation-state, they did not theorize it, for they viewed it as merely an instance of a broader industrial or capitalist society. Then suddenly they recognized the nation-state – at the supposed moment of its decline! The belief that globalization is undermining the nation-state is very widespread (e.g., Harvey, 1989; Robinson & Harris, 2000; Albrow, 1996: 91; Baumann, 1998: 55–76; Giddens, 1990; Lash & Urry, 1994: 280–1; Waters, 1995). Beck (2001: 21) says that globalization is “denationalization.” He critiques what he calls “methodological nationalism,” which relies on the “container theory” of society – *mea culpa*, though my metaphor is a cage. But he says that these containers have sprung leaks, global fluidity and mobility are now rampant, and “the unity of the national state and national society comes unstuck.” Geographers coined the term “glocalization” to indicate that the nation-state was being undermined from both above and below, for global economic forces also strengthen local networks like world cities and Silicon Valleys, connected more to the global than the national economy (e.g., Swyngedouw, 1997).



All this is greatly exaggerated, as we shall see. It is a very Western-centric view, tending to see market capitalism as universal. Yet as we shall see, much of the world lives under politicized versions of capitalism in which one acquires access to economic resources through connections to the state. Moreover, even in the West the state is not so much declining as changing. The global economy still needs regulation by states, and nation-states have acquired a whole range of new functions, from providing welfare to interfering in family and sexual life (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Mann, 1997). Osterhammel and Petersson (2005) reject what they call the liberal determinism of much globalization research. They see no single global social structure at work, and the nation-state remains strong, still involved in tariff wars, trade disputes, and stricter migration controls. Holton (1998: 108–34) stresses the staying power of states, which have been reinforced by stronger notions of ethnicity, and their combination can mount vigorous resistance to the forces of global capitalism. Scholte (2000) disagrees, seeing state and nation decoupling amid a proliferation of cosmopolitan and hybrid identities. He says globalization involves “deterritorialization,” although this does not mean the end of the state. Rather, he says, governance becomes more multilayered as regulation is divided among substate, state, and suprastate agencies. Weiss (1999) observes that when states retreat, they initiate the action, as, for example, when they implement neoliberal policies. They could as easily initiate a resurgence of their powers. International relations (IR) theorists are divided over the nation-state. Some accept that in a postnuclear age states do not behave as if they live in a simple Westphalian world (they never did, of course). Some accept that transnational forces are undermining states, producing more varied governance structures. In the 1980s IR theorists split between realists, clinging to the state as an actor, and interdependence theorists, stressing economic and normative ties across the globe carried by transnational capitalism, global civil society, and global governance.

When did the nation-state supposedly dominate and when did it decline? Pietersee says that from the 1840s to the 1960s “the nation-state was the single dominant organizational option” for human society. This is both exaggerated and Eurocentric. Western Europe did move somewhat in that period toward nation-states; Eastern Europe moved back and forth between them and empires. But the rest of the world remained dominated by empires. Even in Europe nation-states did rather little until after World War I, for before then states had few economic policies beyond tariffs and currencies and almost no social policies. Their intensive power over their territories was usually rather limited: the lives of most people were dominated by local power networks, while some elites were fairly transnational. We saw in Volume 3 that a sense of nationhood did diffuse but that it rarely dominated peoples’ consciousness. Then the planning pretensions that states had acquired in World War I were exposed as hollow by the Great Depression. So they briefly returned to what they had always done best, making war.

After World War II, however, most of their swords were turned into plowshares and their economic and social policies deepened. So it was only in the short period after 1945 that states developed much greater infrastructural power among their citizens. Only then might it seem that nation-states were becoming the world's common political form. In this short period all but two empires collapsed, while the number of self-styled nation-states kept rising. There are now more than 190 member states of the United Nations, though many of them have very limited powers over their supposed territories. Moreover, alongside the transnational elements of modern globalization are international elements composed of relations among the representatives of states – like the UN, the IMF, the G-20. Geopolitics have gone more global and more pacific – “soft geopolitics” is the conventional label for this new external realm of nation-states. But they still involve the relations among states.

The nation-state and globalization have not been rivals in a zero-sum game with one undermining the other. They rose together in a first phase, discussed in Volumes 2 and 3, when the motherlands of empires became nation-states. Osterhammel and Petersson (2005) note that while the emergence of imperialism and the Atlantic economy created networks of traffic, communication, migration, and commerce, amid the growth of these global networks, nation-states and nationalist movements also strengthened. In a second phase, discussed in this volume, nation-states emerged globally out of the colonial ashes, and the more advanced nation-states acquired much greater powers over, and responsibility for, the lives of their citizens. As my second volume argued, the last two or three centuries have seen the entwined growth of nation-states and capitalism. The European Union is a more complex political form, embodying both Europe-wide political institutions and autonomous nation-states. But it is ultimately driven by the interests of the most powerful member states. The Soviet and American empires constituted more fundamental exceptions, and the latter endures as the only global empire the world has ever seen. So current globalization is driven by capitalism, nation-states, and American empire, which are the major power institutions discussed in this volume.

The entwining of these three major power organizations has generated globally diffusing ideologies. In Volume 3 we saw the influence of communism and fascism. In this one we will see the importance of social and Christian democracy, liberalism and neoliberalism, and religious fundamentalism. And although interstate wars have declined greatly since World War II, they have been replaced by a cold war, civil wars, and American militarism. Thus this period of globalizations requires explanation in terms of all the four sources of social power. Globalization is universal but polymorphous. Human groups need meaning systems; they need to extract resources from nature for their subsistence; they need defense and perhaps offense as long as the world remains

dangerous; and they need law and order over defined, controlled territories. Societies – networks of interaction at the boundaries of which exists a certain degree of cleavage – involve ideological, economic, military, and political power organizations. These contain different logics operating over different spaces, all in principle of equal causal significance. Sometimes they reinforce each other, sometimes they contradict each other, mostly they are just orthogonal to each other, different and disjunctive, creating unintended problems for each other, preventing coherence and singular integration in the expansion process, as we will see in the following chapters.

I begin in Chapter 2 by discussing the postwar global order (although it also contained disorder in some parts of the world). Its three pillars were neo-Keynesian economic policies, both domestic and international; a cold war that intensified an ideological power struggle yet also stabilized geopolitical relations and cemented order among most of the advanced countries of the world; and American empire. Given the importance of the United States, I then spend two chapters analyzing the development of American society up to the 1960s. Chapter 5 analyzes American imperialism across the world, stressing its variety – in some regions it has been rather militaristic, in others only hegemonic; in some regions successful in its goals, in others misguided and unsuccessful, leaving unfinished business for the new century (discussed in Chapter 10). Chapter 6 begins by analyzing the ability of postwar liberals, social democrats, and Christian Democrats to humanize capitalism by achieving greater citizen rights and neo-Keynesian mass consumption economic policies, but it ends by charting the faltering of this brief golden age and the rise of harsher neoliberal regimes. Chapter 7 discusses the failure of the Soviet communist alternative as well as the relative failure of the post-Soviet countries to effect the desired transition to democratic capitalism. Chapter 8 discusses the second major communist regime, China, and its pioneering a much more effective economic transition toward a hybrid of the party-state and market capitalism, though with no pretense of moving toward democracy. Chapter 9 develops a theory of modern revolution drawing from material from Volume 3 as well as this one.

Chapter 10 contrasts the enduring success of American economic imperialism with its abject failure in seeking a resurgence of military imperialism. Chapter 11 discusses the paradox of neoliberalism: on the one hand, its harmful economic policies led not to an increase in collective power but to the Great Recession of 2008; on the other hand, it only seemed to intensify its distributive power among the advanced countries. These two chapters conclude by focusing on the relative decline of the West in face of the rise of the Rest. Chapter 12 discusses the looming disaster of climate change and emphasizes just how massive is the task of combating it. Climate change ironically results from the three great success stories of the twentieth century: capitalist pursuit

of profit, nation-states' commitment to economic growth, and citizens' pursuit of mass consumption rights. To challenge them is to challenge the three most powerful institutions of recent years. Finally, Chapter 13 attempts conclusions at two levels, offering generalizations on the global trajectory of modern society, as well as on the debate within sociological theory on the question of ultimate primacy – what is it that ultimately drives society forward?

PROOF